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Résumé
Selon un point de vue hégémonique en économie politique au Canada, l’exportation de 
produits bruts dominerait le profil commercial du Canada, au détriment des produits 
manufacturés. La montée en flèche de la valeur des exportations d’énergie canadiennes et 
une forte tradition d’importation de produits finis manufacturés semble donner raison aux 
économistes politiques nationalistes de gauche qui brossent le portrait d’une économie 
où le secteur manufacturier serait sous-développé. Or, grâce à un examen empirique, le 
présent article remet en question certaines présuppositions répandues sur ce qui constitue 
une exportation de produits « manufacturés » et avance que le profil commercial du Canada 
concorde parfaitement avec celui d’une économie capitaliste avancée. Le nationalisme 
de gauche s’appuie à tort sur des catégories appropriées pour une économie dépendante, 
inappropriées pour le Canada. Une approche marxiste montre une économie avec un 
marché intérieur relativement développé, où la « création de plus-value » vise la classe 
capitaliste canadienne, au lieu d’en faire fi comme ce serait le cas dans une économie 
dépendante.
Abstract
The hegemonic view in Canadian political economy is that Canada’s trade profile is weighted 
towards the export of unprocessed products, and away from manufactured products. With 
the soaring value of Canadian energy exports, combined with an import history weighted 
towards the import of finished manufactured goods, left nationalist political economy 
seems to be on strong footing painting a picture of an economy with an underdeveloped 
manufacturing sector. This article will empirically re-examine Canada’s trade profile, 
question some common assumptions about what constitutes ‘manufactured’ exports, and 
argue that Canada’s trade profile is perfectly compatible with that of an advanced capitalist 
  This is part of a larger research project into the political economy of Canadian trade. It is a 
continuation of research presented in 2005 (Kellogg, 2005a). Some of the ideas were first sketched 
out in my Ph.D. dissertation (Kellogg, 99).
2  Paul Kellogg, Ph.D. (Queen’s), M.A. (York) teaches in the Department of International 
Development Studies at Trent University. Recent publications include “Regional Integration in Latin 
America: Dawn of an Alternative to Neoliberalism?” (New Political Science, Vol. 29, No. 2, June 
2007 pp. 87-209) and “Kari Levitt and the Long Detour of Canadian Political Economy” (Studies in 
Political Economy 76, Autumn, 2005, pp. 31-60). He can be reached at paulkellogg@trentu.ca
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economy. Left nationalism has mistakenly relied on categories appropriate to dependent 
economies, categories inappropriate for Canada. A Marxist approach reveals an economy 
with a more or less developed ‘home market’ economy, where the ‘self-expansion of value’ 
is directed towards the Canadian capitalist class, not away from it, as would be expected 
in a dependent economy.
Introduction
Jim Stanford, one of Canada’s most prominent political economists, kicked off 2007 with 
the rewrite of an old proposition – the image of Canada as a hewer of wood and a drawer 
of water. By 999, he said, with a steady rise of manufacturing exports, the Canadian 
economy seemed to have escaped this fate, long the expected curse of an over-reliance 
on natural resource development (2007: A3). But the reprieve proved short-lived. With 
tar sands development beginning to dominate economic expansion, Canada was now a 
‘hewer of wood and a pumper of oil’. Stanford’s clever rewriting of the old proposition was 
based on one of the most important, and most enduring, methods for assessing Canadian 
economic development – measuring “the proportion of Canadian exports that consists of 
finished goods, rather than unprocessed or partially-processed resources” (2007: A13). 
Stanford’s proposition is, that with the rapid rise of energy, especially tar-sands based oil 
exports, Canada’s economic structure is regressing.
Stanford’s analysis is strongly grounded in the Canadian political economy tradition. 
Central to this tradition is the very proposition advanced by Stanford – that the structure 
and composition of foreign trade is an important indicator of the level of a country’s 
economic development. The classic statement of this thesis was in Glen Williams’ oft-
reprinted Not for Export (Williams, 994; Williams, 986). Roughly put – consistently high 
levels of exports of agricultural products and crude materials combined with consistently 
high levels of imports of finished, manufactured end products, can be seen as a sign of 
economic underdevelopment.
This article will argue that while this is, in a very general sense, a reasonable proposition 
– it has been consistently misapplied to the Canadian economy. The article will: ) survey 
the way in which assumptions about resource trade figure prominently in contemporary 
assessments of Canada’s level of economic development; 2) look behind the prima facie 
case for linking Canada’s trade structure to the economy’s ‘underdevelopment’; 3) examine 
the controversy over the role of the auto sector in assessing Canadian trade statistics, 4) 
look in-depth at the peculiar, and misunderstood category, Fabricated Materials: Inedible; 
and finally, 5) interrogate the post-1999 rise in crude material export, and see if it really is 
a sign of manufacturing regression. Throughout, the article will argue that fundamental to 
the confusion surrounding the analysis of Canadian trade has been the mistaken assumption 
that categories appropriate to dependent economies can be used in the Canadian context. 
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This has proven to be false. If one of the difficulties faced by dependent economies is the 
difficulty of establishing a home market – a self-sustaining regime of capital accumulation 
– this has not been one of the difficulties faced by Canada since the establishment of a 
home-market economy in the mid-19th century.
Trade and Canadian Political Economy
Most political economists of the left have seen trade as the Achilles heel of the Canadian 
economy. Canada is unusually dependent on the export trade in general, it is argued, and 
the export of raw materials in particular. One of the great resources for students of political 
economy in Canada has been a series of compilations, beginning with the 978 A Practical 
Guide to Canadian Political Economy (Clement and Drache, 978), and continuing into 
this century with Changing Canada: Political Economy as Transformation (Clement and 
Vosko, 2003). The 1997 edition contained a serious restatement of the political economy 
approach to Canadian development, where this view of the importance of Canada’s trade 
structure was given pride of place.
[T]he Canadian economy has never acquired the authentic attributes of a bona fide 
national economy. Rather, in this century, and as far back as the initial European 
colonization, Canada’s economy has been a subordinate adjunct or satellite, of more 
developed economies....[T]his view is grounded in three considerations: unmatched 
levels of FDI and foreign control of production; the resource-extraction base of 
foreign trade; and the branch-plant organization of manufacturing by parent U.S. 
industries (Clement and Williams, 1997: 60).
Glen Williams more than anyone has given theoretical shape to this line of reasoning 
in his widely read and quite influential Not For Export. The 980’s edition was rightly 
included by Drache and Clement as one of the thirty-three ‘staple readings’ in Canadian 
political economy, one of those key works which has contributed much to the literature 
(Drache and Clement, 985: 227-29). The 990’s edition became a staple in its own right 
in reading lists for courses on Canadian political economy. In this work, Williams cited 
an economic proposition that “high exports of finished manufactures indicate high levels 
of industrialization” (Williams, 986: 8) and showed that even in 980, Canada’s relatively 
low levels of manufactured exports raised questions about Canada’s degree of industrial 
development. In 1955, by his figures, Canada’s exports of finished manufactures as a share 
of total exports was 11%, while only Sweden and France were significantly below 50% 
(each above one-third, however) of eight industrial countries (the OECD Group of Seven, 
plus Sweden). By 980, Canada was up to 32%, but now all the other seven countries were 
above 50%, and manifestly underdeveloped India at was at 23% and Brazil at 22%, not far 
off the Canadian figure (Williams, 1986: 8-9).
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From the 1986 edition to the 1994 edition, Williams’ analysis underwent an important 
evolution.  Between the two editions was an influential 1988 article, where Williams 
grappled with the issue of Canada’s place in the world economy. He rejected both the 
classical dependency framework and the ‘advanced imperialist’ school represented in 
particular by David McNally (98) and William Carroll (985). As an alternative, he 
argued that Canada should be seen as a “region within the centre” (Williams, 988: 36). 
This evolution in his thinking was reflected in changes made to the 1990’s edition of Not 
for Export. The earlier edition was called, Not for Export: Toward a Political Economy 
of Canada’s Arrested Industrialization. The 994 edition was called Not For Export: 
The International Competitiveness of Canadian Manufacturing. “[I]t could be debated” 
Williams says in the 986 edition “whether Canada more properly belongs among the 
semi-industrials” (Williams, 986: 8-9). But that section is gone from the 990’s edition. It 
is worth quoting at length the new material inserted in its place.
[Political economist Alfred] Maizels … debated the appropriate category in which 
to place Canada. Important to his choice were the relatively high value of Canada’s 
per capita production and also the relatively high proportion of our semi-processed 
but nonetheless manufactured exports....In the end … Maizels decided to place 
Canada among the industrials (Williams, 1994: 21).
The evolution in Williams’ thinking is important, and the points he tentatively highlights 
here will loom large in the discussion below.
The Prima Facie Empirical Case
Empirically, there was apparently a basis for Williams’ 986 argument from the standpoint 
of the 1950s and 1960s. Chart 1 documents the trajectory of Canadian end product (finished 
manufactures) exports as a percent of all exports from 946 to 96. Canada’s percentage 
share of end product exports is nowhere near the 50% mark documented by Williams as 
typical of advanced capitalist countries. It sits at just 5% in 946, slides to just above 6% 
in 1955, and creeps back to just above the 8% mark in 1961. These are, in fact, extremely 
low figures.
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Chart 1: End Product Exports as a Percent of all Exports, Canada, 1946-1961
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(Leacy, 982: Series G45-G442; Statistics Canada, Dec. 978; 98;984; Statistics 
Canada, Dec. 986; Dec. 988; CANSIM II, Table 228003)
But in the decades since, this trend has been entirely reversed.  Chart 2 takes this method 
(expressing end product exports as a percent of all exports) and extends it into the present. 
The results speak for themselves.
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Chart 2: End Product Exports as a Percent of all Exports, Canada, 1946-2006
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(Leacy, 982: Series G45-G442; Statistics Canada, Dec. 978; 98; 984; Statistics 
Canada, Dec. 986; Dec. 988; CANSIM II, Table 22803)
From the early 1960s on, end product exports as a percent of all exports rise from below 
0%, to between 30 and 40% in the 970s, and then between 40 and 50% from the mid 980s 
to the present. This is, by Williams’ own criteria, the trade profile of a fully industrialized 
country.3 There is, however, a pronounced decline from 999 to 2006, evidence cited by 
Stanford earlier in this article to document a slide back into underdevelopment. This aspect 
of the data will be dealt with in the final section of this article.
What of the other half of the proposition – that of a reliance on high levels of imported 
finished manufactured goods? Williams makes a good deal of this point, basing his 
paradigm, on Alfred Maizels, an authority who will loom large in these pages.
As a corollary of his proposition that high exports of finished manufactures indicate 
high levels of industrialization, Maizels suggested that the larger industrial countries 
3  There is also a prima facie case for the left nationalist and new political economy assumptions 
when it comes to foreign ownership, although the periodization is somewhat different. Through the 
950s and into the early 970s, there is statistical evidence that could be cited as proof of unusually 
high levels of foreign ownership. But there is an enormous change in the opposite direction through 
the 970s, 980s and early 990s. A brief return to increasing levels of foreign ownership occurred 
in the mid to late 990s, but was soon followed in the 2st century by a renewed change away from 
the expected trajectory implicit in the dependent Canada assumptions (Kellogg, 2005b).
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were less dependent on imports of manufactures than the smaller industrials, semi-
industrials, and non-industrials (Williams, 1994: 19-20).
A useful device for highlighting this is to express end product exports as a percent of 
end product imports. The lower the figure, the greater the gap between end product 
exports and end product imports, the greater the ‘dependency’ of the economy on end 
products manufactured abroad. Chart 3 documents this for the same period as Chart , 
and if anything, the picture that emerges is even stronger than that outlined in Chart . 
In 1946, Canadian end product manufacturing exports were just half the figure of end 
product imports.  By 1956, this had declined to just 10%. This is an extraordinary figure. It 
paints a picture of an economy where masses of finished manufacturing goods are pouring 
in across the border, far out of proportion to the export of manufacturing goods being 
exported abroad, once again reinforcing Williams’ thesis.
Chart 3: End Product Exports as a Percent of End Product Imports, Canada, 
1946-1961
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(Leacy, 982: Series G45-G442; Statistics Canada, Dec. 978; 98; 984; Statistics 
Canada, Dec. 986; Dec. 988; CANSIM II, Table 22803)
But Chart 4 extends the time frame to 2006, and again, the picture is completely reversed. 
The picture painted is actually quite revealing. By the 1970s, the figure rises from just over 
10% to between 50 and 60%. By the 1990s and into the 21st century, the figure rises again 
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to between 70 and 85%. In other words, over time, Canada’s capacity to export end products 
is growing more quickly than its need to import end products. There is still a gap between 
the two. Canada still imports more end products than it exports – but presumably this is 
only relevant if it is a sign of an ongoing structural underdevelopment of manufacturing in 
the country. If end product exports are growing faster than end product imports, such an 
underdevelopment cannot be demonstrated.
Chart 4: End Product Exports as a Percent of End Product Imports, Canada, 
1946-2006
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(Leacy, 982: Series G45-G442; Statistics Canada, Dec. 978; 98; 984; Statistics 
Canada, Dec. 986; Dec. 988; CANSIM II, Table 22803)
At the very least, it is necessary to severely temper the claims made by Williams and 
others. Yes an imbalance exists; no it has not prevented the development of a powerful 
Canadian manufacturing sector (a finished manufacturing sector). And that imbalance is 
today, far less than it was half a century ago. The trend is very clear.
The impact of a negative balance in the trade of finished manufactures is quite different in 
an advanced capitalist country like Canada, than in an underdeveloped economy in Latin 
America or Africa (Kellogg, 2005b: 49-5). In the latter, such a ‘technological dependence’ 
could well be a barrier to economic development. But in an advanced capitalist country, 
particularly one of relatively small population such as Canada, the existence of high levels 
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of importation of foreign machinery is not unusual. Once again it is Maizels who makes 
precisely this point.
Unlike the effect on exports, the effect of industrialization on the proportion of 
imports consisting of manufactures varies considerably from country to country and 
from one period to another. This is because the import pattern of an industrializing 
country is heavily dependent on its resource-endowment, as well as on its developing 
pattern of demand....[D]ifferent tendencies among the industrial countries reflect 
the fact that the smaller countries inevitably tend to specialize, while the larger 
ones produce virtually the whole range of manufactured goods. Thus, the smaller 
industrial countries depend heavily on the larger ones for increases in their 
requirement of manufactures, so that as their economies expand the proportion of 
manufactures in their total imports tends to rise (1963: 66-67).
The Auto Pact Effect
This is why, again and again, auto industry statistics take centre stage in arguments about 
Canada’s industrial structure. Unless statistics on auto exports are deliberately excluded, 
no case can be made about Canada having a ‘truncated’ or ‘undeveloped’ manufacturing 
sector. Williams points out that the largest single component of Canada’s manufactured 
exports are vehicles covered by the Auto Pact, and that these are ‘intra-firm transfers’.  If 
they are excluded, then Canada’s share of manufactured exports drops to 22% in 980. 
“This leaves us squarely in the company of Brazil and India” (Williams, 986: 0).
The exclusion of Auto Pact trade is fairly common among Canadian political economists. 
I have looked at this argument in detail elsewhere (Kellogg, 2003; 2004) challenging this 
now well-established practice of analyzing the Canadian economy as if the auto sector 
did not exist. If the argument was that the branch plant nature of this production made 
it temporary and impermanent, then that impermanence is now two or three generations 
old. If the argument was that the branch plant nature of this production would ensure U.S. 
dominance in the sector, then the steady expansion of Toyota, Nissan and other non-U.S. 
auto producers cannot be explained – nor can the emergence of Franch Stronach’s very 
Canadian Magna Corporation as the dominant auto parts producer in the entire sector.4
For the purposes of this article, two charts will be provided – and the readers can draw 
their own conclusion. Chart 5 shows the composition of all exports, from 96 to 2006. 
The trend is clear and unmistakable – the export of end products (finished manufactured 
4  This latter fact is extremely ironic. Fear of dependency on U.S. corporations led many on the left 
in the 1960s to advocate the creation of an all-Canadian car (Anastakis, 2004: 109). As Stronach 
moves closer to being able to move from a parts-maker to full assembly, we are on the verge of getting 
just such a creature. It is not clear what we would celebrate however – Magna being one of the more 
avaricious and union-busting companies operating in Canada (Gindin, 2007).
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products) takes up a greater and greater share of all Canadian exports, moving from 
roughly 0% in 96, to roughly 50% in recent years.
Chart 5: Composition of Exports, Canada, 1961-2006
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(Dominion Bureau of Statistics, External Trade Branch, January 947;December 947-
96; Dominion Bureau of Statistics, External Trade Branch, January 962; December 
965-97; Statistics Canada, External Trade Division, December 974; Statistics Canada, 
External Trade Division, December 975-984; CANSIM II, Table 228003.)
Chart 6 draws the same picture, but excluding auto and truck assembly, and auto and 
truck parts manufacture. The resulting picture is different, but not qualitatively. Finished 
manufacture exports in 1961 are less than 10% of all exports. That figure then rises steadily, 
until in recent years, it sits between 30 and 45%. Now this is less than the percentages 
which include the auto sector.  But the critical issue is the trend – and without question, the 
long-term trend over three generations is for a steady increase in the proportion of trade 
devoted to finished manufactured goods.
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Chart 6: Composition of Exports (excluding autos and trucks), Canada, 1961-2006 
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96; Dominion Bureau of Statistics, External Trade Branch, January 962, December 
965-97; Statistics Canada, External Trade Division, December 974; Statistics Canada, 
External Trade Division, December 975-984; CANSIM II, Table 228003.)
The claim that has been aggressively advanced by most of the theorists within the school of 
new political economy, is that Canada has a long-term structural weakness in end products 
export trade. Once the actual figures are examined, no such claim can be made. The most 
that can be asserted is that through the 950s, Canada’s share of exports which were 
finished manufactures was lower than the norm for other advanced capitalist countries, 
considerably lower. But from 1961 to the present, there has been a dramatic rise in finished 
manufacturing exports, even with the ‘Auto Pact Effect’ as outlined by Williams. With the 
Auto Pact Effect, the rate of growth is the same, but there is still 0 to 5% to be made 
up. Without the Auto Pact Effect, Canada has reached a level of finished manufacture 
exports equivalent to other advanced capitalist economies. So perhaps an argument could 
be developed about a somewhat weaker position based on somewhat lower rates of finished 
manufacture export. But this is a much weaker argument than that maintained throughout 
the new political economy literature. Even if the claims involved in Williams’ Auto Pact 
Effect argument are accepted, the statistics simply do not bear out the extreme claims 
about truncated manufacturing and industrial weakness made on the basis of this effect by 
Williams and many others.
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Which, of course, begs the question as to why it should be seen as acceptable to exclude 
intra-firm transfers as Williams proposes. Now all statistics have to be kept in perspective, 
and they are indeed only one of many available windows into the workings of an economy. 
Like all windows, they are sometimes more and sometimes less obscure, but like all they 
do tell something about what happens in that economy. To say that the window on auto 
trade tells nothing about the Canadian economy (which is in fact what is being argued), 
is to pretend that it simply doesn’t exist. But in the real world, its existence is palpable. 
The existence of autos to export (even as intra-firm transfers) implies the existence of an 
auto industry. The 172,000 Canadians who worked building car and trucks in Canada in 
200 – a higher per capita proportion than in the U.S. (Aerospace and Automotive Branch, 
Industry Canada: 52) – are in one of the largest per capita auto-producing economies in the 
world (International Organization of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers). Oshawa, site of origin 
of many of these intra-firm transfers, is one of North America’s most productive vehicle 
production centres (Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, 2003). Ontario, in 2005, 
surpassed Michigan as the biggest centre in North America for vehicle production – much 
to the chagrin of many in the U.S. (Hoffman, 2005). Just-In-Time delivery schedules and 
Canada’s role in what is emerging as a world division of labour in automobile production 
are promoting the growth of Canadian-based car parts manufacturers, propelling Frank 
Stronach’s Magna to the very pinnacle of the auto parts heap (Gindin, 2007).
The point is, that trade figures are indicators of economic activity. “[I]ncreasingly, 
international trade occurs between related parties especially international firms and their 
affiliates” (Macdonald, 1985: 242). To single out Canadian auto trade as the only chunk of 
world manufacturing trade to be written out of a statistical comparison with other actors 
in the world economy — which all have small and large chunks of trade in the form of 
intra-firm transfers — is not tenable.
One final point needs to be made. Canada is one of the world’s leaders in its total volume 
of trade. A small percentage of manufacturing trade for Canada actually conceals a quite 
high total volume of manufacturing trade, given the fact that it imports and exports at a per 
capita rate that is three times that of the U.S. (Kellogg, 2005: 44-45).
The conclusion seems relatively straightforward. The facts presented here do not conform 
to the picture of Canada as a semi-industrial, let alone an underdeveloped economy. They 
do fit very well with the picture of Canada as a first-world, advanced capitalist economy, 
where the self-expansion of value is resulting in an expanding capacity to export fully 
manufactured goods abroad.
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Of Nails and Needles – Fabricated Materials (Inedible)
If the difficulty with Williams’ argument is the fact that it excludes the manufacturing 
activity of Windsor and Oshawa from a conceptual picture of Canada’s industrial structure, 
it is necessary to highlight the fact that the statistics that are being used here already 
eliminate Hamilton and its massive steel mills, as well as much of Cornwall, Sudbury, 
Sarnia and British Columbia from that same picture. An examination of the raw figures 
that went into creating Chart 5 (above) is quite revealing. From a very low point of 9% of 
total trade, ‘end products inedible’ steadily grow as a proportion of total Canadian exports, 
peaking at 55% in 1999, and being steadily above 40% since 1984. But the remaining 
exports are not the raw materials and primary products that much of the new political 
economy literature implies.  In 96, for instance, the biggest single category of Canadian 
export was ‘Fabricated Materials, Inedible’ with a 48% share of total exports. From 1961 
until 1968 Fabricated Materials, Inedible comprised the biggest category of Canadian 
exports. From 1968 on it retreats, to second place (behind end product exports) but still 
stays above the exports of crude materials and agricultural products (See Chart 5). When 
this category is interrogated, it becomes clear that this very large category of Canadian 
exports is an extremely heterogeneous one, grouping together products as diverse as yarn 
and railway tracks.
This is not a small matter. One of its biggest sub-categories is chemicals. Here are included 
such capital-intensive manufacturing activities as synthetic rubber and plastic materials 
production. Iron and steel is another sub-category, including such manufacturing products 
as bars and rods, steel sheets and steel plates and railway track material (hence the reference 
to Hamilton). The biggest sub-category is wood and paper, incorporating products from 
all Canadian sawmills and all pulp and paper plants. That provides a clearer basis for 
interpreting Charts 5 and 6. The point is, much of what is included in the fabricated 
materials section of the charts is capital-intensive manufacturing – even if the result is 
not, strictly speaking, an end product. And in both – including the one which excludes the 
auto sector – a clear picture is presented of a relentless transformation in Canada’s export 
profile, away from a reliance on the export of agricultural goods and raw materials, and 
towards a reliance on fully-manufactured and semi-manufactured goods.
Even as early as 1961 when the proportion of Canadian exports going towards finished 
manufactures was quite low, still a majority of Canada’s exports was comprised of products 
that were in some way subject to manufacturing processes – perhaps a hewer of wood, 
but with the assistance of giant tractors and large factories: perhaps a drawer of water, 
but through an intricate system of dams and hydraulic lift systems. Second, there has 
been a relentless increase of finished manufacturing exports at the expense of the share of 
export going towards fabricated, or semi-manufactured products. Third and probably most 
importantly, there has been an even more impressive increase of both categories together, 
Of Nails and Needles: A Reconsideration of the
Political Economy of Canadian Trade
80
squeezing the share of agricultural and crude material exports into a smaller and smaller 
area of the chart. That steadily declining portion of the graph, to complete the metaphor 
that is here being stretched, is a representation of the place of the agricultural economy 
of the Prairies, the Atlantic Fisheries and the Niagara fruit belt in the Canadian economy. 
Their place is steadily declining relative to the other two categories. This is not a picture 
of an economy caught in a staple trap, unable to break from a reliance on raw material, 
resource export, unable to develop a manufacturing potential.
No image dominates the new political economy literature as much as this picture of 
Canada’s truncated manufacturing sector. And this has been one of the most powerful 
buttresses of the image, statistical pictures showing low percentage levels of finished 
manufacturing exports. Williams puts the case well.
Industrialization is said to be associated with economic development because it leads 
to increases in both labour productivity and real incomes. In turn, relative levels 
of industrialization and worldwide industrial competitive power can be measured 
through manufactured exports because industrial growth enhances trade potential. 
This accounts for the ‘remarkably close relationship over the past 60 years in the 
relative growth rates of the main industrial countries and their shares of the world 
export market in manufactures’ (Williams, 1986: 7).
The authority Williams is quoting is, again, Alfred Maizels (963: 57), but it is interesting 
to note that, as it concerned Canada, Maizels work does not draw the same conclusions 
as Williams did in 986. Maizels does note that Canada in the 950s has a low share of 
its exports that can be classified as finished manufactures. But Maizels has other criteria 
that are crucially important in categorizing the place of economies in the world system. 
One extremely important one is the productivity of manufacturing employment, the dollar-
value of production manufactures per head. Canada might have had a low level of finished 
manufacturing export, but it was second only to the United States in manufacturing 
productivity.  In 1955, the U.S. was first at $5730 of production per employed manufacturing 
worker, Canada was second at $4380 and Sweden was a distant third at $3050 (Maizels, 
963: 3). Maizels pays careful attention to the Canadian case when categorizing the world 
into industrial countries and semi-industrials. He documents that an examination of the 
raw statistics reveals that Canada’s share of finished manufacturing export is incredibly 
low compared to the United States and Western Europe. He argues that on the basis of 
these statistics, ‘Canada falls between’ the industrially advanced countries of Western 
Europe and the United States and a second group of countries where exports of finished 
manufactures accounted for under 5% of their total exports (such as Australia). However, 
he argues:
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[I]n export structure Canada is, in fact, much more like Norway, Sweden and Holland 
than she is like Australia. One-half of Canada’s exports are industrial products 
(even though most are intermediates) … Further the degree of industrialization in 
the Canadian economy is significantly greater than in Australia, while Canadian 
productivity in manufacturing is second only to that in the United States. A final 
consideration is the very close inter-relation that has developed, particularly during 
and since the last war, between the Canadian economy and that of the United States. 
In many respects, the two countries can effectively be regarded as a single economic 
system, and they are likely to grow closer together in the future as their economies 
expand. For this reason, as much as for the others, it was decided to classify Canada 
in the same broad grouping as the United States (Maizels, 1962: 60-2).
If this conclusion could be drawn in the mid 950s on the basis of a very low share of 
manufacturing export, in 2st century, there is no question what conclusion should be 
drawn.
Since Maizels wrote his text, there have been quantitative but not qualitative changes in 
this picture. Chart 7 tracks the value of manufacturing production, per manufacturing 
worker, in Canada and the U.S., from 1970 through 2006. Until the late 1980s, productivity 
in the manufacturing sector (measured as value-added per manufacturing worker) is 
almost identical. There is a divergence visible in the 990s, with US productivity growing 
consistently faster than Canadian.
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Chart 7: Production per manufacturing worker (1990 U.S. dollars), Canada and the 
U.S., 1970-2006
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(Bureau of Labor Statistics; CANSIM II Table 228003; United Nations Statistics 
Division)
But when other factors are brought into consideration, it seems probable that this divergence 
in manufacturing productivity has more to do with employment and lay-off patterns in the 
two countries. Chart 8 shows the history of per-capita manufacturing employment in the 
two countries for the same time-frame.
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Chart 8: Production per manufacturing worker (1990 U.S. dollars), Canada and 
the U.S., 1970-2006
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In 970, manufacturing employment in the U.S. represented 9% of its entire population, 
Canada trailing with a figure of 7%. But in the ensuing years, manufacturing employment 
in the U.S. has fallen drastically, so that by 2006, it represented just over 4.5% of the 
population. That is, in per capita terms, there were almost 50% fewer manufacturing 
workers in the U.S. in 2006 than in 1970. Canada’s history is quite different, per capita 
manufacturing employment staying between 6% and 7.5% for the entire period. Far more 
manufacturing layoffs have happened in the U.S. than in Canada. In eliminating lower-
productivity jobs, productivity figures in the U.S. do look better than in Canada – but that 
reflects more productive downsizing, not more productive manufacturing.
It is always important for political economists to peer behind the categories as provided 
by the statistical gathering machines of the state apparatus. A quick look at Canadian 
manufacturing export statistics can seem to paint a picture of a semi-industrial country. 
But, as has been shown, a more detailed and careful examination gives exactly the opposite 
picture. The big winner over the last 50 years in the Canadian export trade has been the 
export of finished manufactures. This is true even if you arbitrarily exclude the export of 
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goods through the Auto Pact (and, as has been argued, there is no plausible reason for so 
doing). The big loser has been the export of agricultural products and crude materials. 
Fabricated materials, which at first blush represent semi-manufactured goods and could be 
used as an argument for categorizing Canada as a ‘semi-industrial’ country hold their own, 
but slowly decline relative to the export of completely manufactured products.
Dominion Bureau of Statistics: Fabricated Statistics, Incredible
If we further interrogate the category ‘Fabricated Materials Inedible’, the argument being 
presented here is again strengthened. It is pretty clear from reading through the relevant 
background papers, that the civil servants who adopted the category ‘Fabricated Materials, 
Inedible’ were not thinking of the question of aiding political economists in the task of 
classifying Canada’s place in the world system. Had they had this task in mind, they would 
have done better to name their effort ‘Fabricated Statistics, Incredible’. They did not 
divide export products solely on the basis of the extent of manufacturing these products 
contained. Sometimes it is unclear as to what they had in mind. The new classification 
came into effect in 96 and it was certainly an advance on the 950’s categories. But 
if the state moved two steps forward by, for the first time, separating out manufacturing 
exports from the gross statistics on export trade, it took one step backward by creating 
an extremely confusing middle category. The background paper to the new classification 
presents the case this way:
Section IV, Fabricated Materials, Inedible, contains all commodities which 
have passed the preliminary stages of processing but which are still used chiefly 
as materials in some later industrial process (Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 
International Trade Division, External Trade Section, 1961: 4).
Read this way, it would be safe to designate all products in this category as semi-
manufactured goods, and conclude that a heavy concentration on their export was 
evidence of the underdevelopment of key sectors of Canadian finished manufacturing. But 
the document goes on to say, however, that
Some commodities in this Section are highly processed and the chief part of 
their value may be derived from manufacturing (Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 
International Trade Division, External Trade Section, 1961: 4).
And now the issue has become quite confused. The chief merit of investigating shares of 
export trade by percentage of items that are manufactured, semi-manufactured and non-
manufactured is to provide a window into the extent of development (understood as the 
extent of industrialization) of a particular economy. But if the single biggest category of 
these statistics is so all inclusive that it lumps together some products which are virtually 
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raw materials and others which are ‘highly processed’, ‘the chief part of their value’ being 
derived from manufacturing, then there is a problem. This very large statistical category 
conceals within itself much of the manufacturing life of what is really a very developed 
industrial economy.
Consider the range of goods that are included in this category:
Examples of the commodities included in this Section are dressed furs, vegetable 
oils, rubber belting, lumber, plywood, millwork, pulp and paper, textile yarns and 
piece goods, chemicals, fertilizers, plastics and synthetic rubber, metal ingots, 
sheets, pipe, wire and hardware (Dominion Bureau of Statistics, International Trade 
Division, External Trade Section, 1961: 4).
There is a world of difference between an economy based on the production of dressed 
furs and an economy based on the production of synthetic rubber and metal sheets. Further 
attempts at elaborating their definition are even more unhelpful.
The distinction between fabricated materials and end products is perhaps the 
greatest innovation embodied in this classification, but the principles underlying 
this distinction can be illustrated by considering the difference between a nail and a 
needle. The nail is of no use by itself; it becomes useful only in connection with other 
materials and then it has lost its identity as a nail by being incorporated with those 
other materials into something quite different from any of them. The needle, on the 
other hand, is used with other materials but emerges from that use still a needle which 
is useful again for the same purpose. In this sense the nail is a fabricated material 
and the needle an end product (Dominion Bureau of Statistics, International Trade 
Division, External Trade Section, 1961: 4).
This is completely unhelpful. An economy based on factories producing needles would 
show up as a highly industrialized first world economy. An economy based on factories 
producing nails would show up as, at best, a semi-industrial second-tier nation, and perhaps 
even a Third World nation. Clearly, scholars working with the results of these laboured 
efforts have to take the resulting statistics with a very large grain of salt.
The Oil and Gas Effect
If the trend since 96 is relatively straightforward – a steady increase in the proportion 
of exports that are fully-manufactured – an examination of both Charts 5 and 6 does show 
a reversal of this trend in the 2st century. By the end of the 20th century, the export of 
finished manufactures had for the first time, crossed the 50% mark. But since then it has 
fallen back by about 10%, and there has been a corresponding increase in the export of 
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goods from the agricultural and crude materials sector. Stanford’s case, that Canada is 
reverting to a “hewer of wood and a pumper of oil” (2007: A3) is based on these statistics, 
seeing in them confirmation of the underdevelopment implicit in Canada’s dependent 
economic structure.
But before such conclusions are drawn, it is important to, this time, interrogate the 
categories involved. What is affecting this picture is the rapid rise of a category combining 
agriculture and crude materials, and the increase in the 2st century is very much in the 
latter – crude materials. Like its cousin, ‘Fabricated Materials, Inedible’, the category is 
extremely heterogeneous. Chart 9 shows that it is the export of oil and natural gas which 
are entirely responsible for the increase in the share of ‘primary’ products in Canada’s 
export profile. 
Chart 9: Oil and Gas Exports as a Percent of
Agricultural and Crude Material Exports, Canada, 1986-2006
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In 986, 25% of Canada’s primary export products were from the oil and gas sector. By 
999, this was just under 40%. In 2005 and 2006, it had exploded to almost 60%.
Now – this makes questionable Stanford’s replacing ‘drawer of water’ with ‘pumper of oil’. 
It is common knowledge that the centre of this boom in oil and gas production is Northern 
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Alberta, and at the core of this boom is the growth of the tar sands. It is simply not credible 
to treat the output of the great tar sands’ boom as being in the same category as, say, the 
fish, fur and lumber identified by Harold Innis’ as the first key staples in the development 
of the modern Canadian economy (Innis, 962: 40-2). Tar sands production is capital-
intensive industrial production on a vast scale. Alfred J. Cavallo (2005: 16-18) makes this 
point very clearly in The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.
Tar sands are of a completely different character than conventional oil deposits; 
making tar sands usable is a capital-intensive venture that requires special 
procedures such as heating to separate the tar from the sand, mixing the tar with a 
diluting agent for pipeline transport, and constructing specially equipped refineries 
for processing.
This is certainly a description of an industry that is extremely environmentally destructive. 
But as a capital-intensive industrial activity, it has nothing in common with the earlier 
staples analyzed in the classic texts of Canadian political economy. We had best become 
accustomed to interrogating these categories in ways appropriate to the 2st century. In 
the desperate search for new sources of oil, tar sands will soon be joined by their distant 
cousin, shale.
Extracting oil from the 3 trillion barrels of oil shale  …  presents its own challenges. 
The term “oil shale” is also quite misleading, since there is no oil in this mineral, 
but rather an organic material called kerogen, which is a precursor of petroleum. 
To extract oil, the shale (typically between 5 and 25 percent kerogen) must first be 
mined, then transported to a plant where it is crushed, then heated to 500 degrees 
Celsius, which pyrolyzes, or decomposes, the kerogen to form oil (Cavallo, 2005: 
16-18).
The use of tar sands and shale to create energy may be signs of cultural decline, 
environmental destruction and short-sighted energy policies. But they are not signs of 
economic underdevelopment. The biggest shale deposits in the world are in the U.S. When 
they come onstream, and begin to show up in U.S. economic statistics, we would be well-
advised to understand these statistics as representing manufacturing and industrial power, 
not manufacturing and industrial decline.
Of Nails and Needles: A Reconsideration of the
Political Economy of Canadian Trade
88
Conclusion
Canada has had a more or less developed home market economy since the latter half of 
the 9th century.5 That is not to say that Canada can survive solely on the basis of its home 
market. As one of the most trade dependent economies in the world, Canada clearly needs 
access to markets far beyond its borders. What it does mean, though is that Canada has 
been the beneficiary of what Marx called the accumulation and reproduction of capital on 
an extended scale (Marx, 986; 80-83). This term is developed in the least read, and maybe 
the most important of Marx’s three-volume anatomy of the capitalist system. There are 
two ways of reading this text. One is to focus on the important argument about the ‘self-
expansion of value’. But the other is to use this notion in the context of the world economy, 
and query the direction of this self-expansion. The very economic basis of imperialism 
is to ensure that the self-expansion of capital flows in the direction of the imperial centre, 
frustrating the development of the periphery. Nominal political sovereignty can be 
compatible with the continuation of an imperialist system, unless it is accompanied by a 
parallel assertion of economic sovereignty, redirecting the self-expansion of value away 
from the centre and toward the periphery.6
This is a fundamentally important point.  It is the reason why an oil state like Alberta has a 
fantastically different economic profile from an oil state like Venezuela. The former is part 
of an advanced capitalist economy with a well-established home market economy. The 
latter has had the development of such an economy frustrated by generations of imperialist 
economic domination. It is why debates over Canada’s place in the world economy matter. 
Whether Canada is part of the world system which benefits from the domination of other 
economies, or is an economy which suffers from domination is, in a certain sense, the first 
question which any political economist has to answer. Hopefully this article has made 
some contribution to this ongoing discussion.
5  A point made very persuasively by H. Clare Pentland (1981).  For a contemporary restatement, 
see Kellogg (2005a).  From a political economy standpoint, Canada’s emergence as an independent 
state in 1867 is coincident with, and dependent on this emergence of a self-sustaining home market 
economy.
6  For evidence of this conflict unfolding in the current reality, a study of the confrontation between 
Bolivia, Venezuela and Ecuador and the foreign energy multinationals which operate on their soil, 
would be a good starting point.
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